Module 3 Operational Framework for the UNIBAT

Module 3 Content

- Introduction to tactical planning guidance and considerations in a PKO

- Threat-based approach, risk mitigation, and MPKI

- Protection of Civilians (POC) planning considerations

- Force Protection (FP) planning considerations

- Military tasks that support the mandate

- Employment of QRF and RES

- Crowd control operations

- UNIBAT working with EOD

- The handling of detainees

- The UNIBAT and ISR

Lesson 3.1
Introduction to Tactical Planning Guidance and Considerations in a PKO

Content

- Tactical planning

- Mission strategy, implementing guidelines for the military

- Overview

- Planning considerations for POC / FP

- COAs and Risk Mitigation introduction

- Phases of response and use of force

Learning Outcomes

- Identify key documents that provide tactical guidance for planning

- Explain the importance of tactical planning in a PKO

- Explain why a threat-based assessment is important to the planning process and how it relates to risk mitigation priorities

- Explain ways to analyse the Operational Environment for FP and POC; describe the difference and focus

- Explain how do phases assist in the planning process

- Explain tactical planning considerations for FP and POC

Main planning documents for UN peacekeeping

Planning documents for peacekeeping operations

PLANNING

Receipt of Mission
↓
Mission analysis
↓
Course of action
↓
Orders production
↓
Execution

Mission Mandate

CONOPS

Mission FP/POC Strategy

Coordinate →

Mission POC Plan

Force Commander OPORD

Sector Commander OPORD

Receipt of mission

UNIBAT Unit Planning

**Sector HQs
UN Regional HQ**
- Political
- **Security (Military)**
- Humanitarian

←

**All UNIBAT orders / plans endorsed and approved by Sector Commander**

Tactical Planning Guide

- **Identify the problems, intent, specified and implied tasks and objectives**

- **Gather information**

- **Generate options to achieve the objectives**

- **Decide way ahead**

- **5Ws- Who, What, Where, When, Why (How)**

- **Approve by Higher HQs, disseminate and rehearse**

Receipt of Mission

↓

Mission Analysis

↓

Course of Action (COA)

↓

Orders Production

↓

Execution

Overview

Receipt of Mission

Mission Analysis

Course of Action (COA)

Orders Production

Execution

Overview

Receipt of Mission

↓

Mission Analysis

↓

Course of Action (COA)

↓

Orders Production

↓

Execution

Overview

Receipt of Mission

Mission Analysis

Course of Action (COA)

Orders Production

Execution

Have COAs to Mitigate Risks Here

IMPACT		Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Moderately Likely	Likely	Very Likely/ Imminent
Catastrophic		Low	MEDIUM	HIGH	VERY HIGH	VERY HIGH
Severe		Low	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	VERY HIGH
Moderate		Very Low	Low	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH
Minor		Very Low	Low	Low	MEDIUM	MEDIUM
Negligible		Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Low

LIKELIHOOD

Overview

Overview

Not a stagnant process- always refining

Receipt of Mission

Mission Analysis

Course of Action (COA)

Orders Production

Execution

Using the MDMP model for UNPKO POC / FP Tactical Planning Considerations

Phased Approach

Focus On Mitigating Risks

FP-UN forces, personnel, structures   **POC-Vulnerable populations**

For FP

Prevention   Pre-emption

Response For POC

Consolidation

Planning efforts focus here for identified risk

React / Actions on Contact For FP

POC and FP Considerations

POC / FP PLANNING				
Receipt of Mission	MISSION ANALYSIS	COA	Orders Production	Execution

IDENTIFY KEY ACTORS → THREAT ANALYSIS → RISK ANALYSIS

IDENTIFY KEY ACTORS → THREAT ANALYSIS → RISK ANALYSIS

TERRAIN ANALYSIS / HUMAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS

CIVILIAN / UN FORCES AND VULNERABLE POPULATIONS

POTENTIAL PERPETRATORS

HOST STATE FORCES

POSSIBLE PROTECTION ACTORS

IDENTIFY KEY ACTORS → THREAT ANALYSIS → RISK ANALYSIS

Force Protection

VULNERABILITY How vulnerable UN Forces / location to threats

+

PROTECTION ACTORS CAPABILITY Able to contribute / assist in FP

+

LEVEL The intent, capability and history of Threats

=

RISK Likelihood and impact of threat actions against UN

Protection of Civilians

VULNERABILITY How vulnerable groups / local to threats

+

PROTECTION ACTORS CAPABILITY Able to protect civilians or assist

+

LEVEL The intent, capability and history of Threats

=

RISK Likelihood and impact of threat actions against civilians

Take Away

- Tactical planning in a PKO requires unique guidance and considerations to help supplement a TCC's national planning process

- All levels of command conduct FP and POC planning, higher HQs commanders must approve a subordinate unit's plans

- Understand the unique PKO planning considerations and guidance for FP / POC; analytical focus includes threats, vulnerabilities, and protector actors that can assist

- The phase approach is a helpful tool for tactical planners

Questions

Lesson 3.2
Threat-based Approach, Risk Mitigation and MPKI

Lesson 3.2 Content

- Threat-based analysis

- Key definitions

- Risks and priorities

- Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (MPKI) overview

- Applications and implementation

- Threat and risk assessments and MPKI products in support of the MDMP

Learning Objectives

- Explain how a threat-based approach / risk mitigation impacts tactical planning and military decision-making process

- Explain the difference between risks and threats

- Describe the MPKI cycle and management tools

- Describe the UN MPKI structures, roles and responsibilities

- Explain how the MPKI products support and are integrated into the MDMP

- Explain why the Phase 1 brief is important

- Explain why it is important to vet military tactical options / COAs within the 3 strategic UN Mandate pillars

"We have a clear lack of tactical intel or

tactical information in the field….

we are not proactive...it's difficult to

anticipate an attack"

Lieutenant General (ret) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz

Mission Threat-based Analysis Overview

UNIBAT Staff and Commanders at all levels should all do an analysis within the unit's Area of Responsibility (AOR)

1. **Identification of Key Actors**
   a. Civilian population
   b. Potential perpetrators
   c. Host State security forces
   d. Other protection actors
   e. Terrain Analysis

2. **Threat Analysis**
   a. Overview
   b. Key Elements
   c. Matrix
   d. Terrain Analysis

3. **Risk Analysis**
   a. Vulnerability assessment
   b. Protection actor capability and ability to prepare or reduce effects of natural hazards /occurrences, (example-flooding) assessments
   c. Danger level assessment
   d. Risk analysis matrix

Threat Analysis Overview

1. Priority consideration to threats identified at the mission level

2. Additional threats identified at the unit's AOR

For each threat determine:

- Situation and type of threat (What)

- Potential perpetrators (Who)

- Potentially affected population to include: civilians, UN personnel, UN facilities, Key Government / Religious facilities, UN Forces (Whom)

- Terrain Analysis / Areas where they may be targeted (Where)

- Days and time of day attacks are most likely (When)

- Motivation behind threat (Why)

- Possible movements and tactics of the armed groups (How)

Risk Analysis Tool

A combination of impact and likelihood associated with an identified threat
Prioritization of risks are classified from- low, medium, to high

For each identified threat.

Here are five separate threats

Applied to the matrix tool

Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (MPKI)

What is Intelligence?

Operational Environment — Collection — Data — Collation, Processing & Exploitation — Information — Analysis & Production — Intelligence

Why the UN Department of Peace Operations Embraces Intelligence

Military Reference:
Military Peacekeeping Intelligence Handbook (MPKI)

United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations /
Department of Field Support
Ref. 2017.07

Policy

Peacekeeping Intelligence

Approved by: USG DPKO
                USG DFS
Effective date: 2 May 2017
Contact: DPKO-DFS/DPET/PBPS Policy Planning Team
Review date: 2 May 2019

Why UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence

- Supports planning and the MDMP

- Identifies threats and accesses their risks

- Supports the Common Operational Picture (COP)

- Supports information operations

- Early warning of imminent threats

MPKI

- Non-clandestine acquisition, processing of information

- Protection of Civilians (POC)- prevent, pre-empt, respond, to counter violence against civilians

- Force Protection (FP)- prevent, react, counter threats against UN forces

- Identifies opportunities in support of the mandate

MPKI Analysis & Products

- Population make-up and threats

- Integration of threat patterns, predictive assessments

- Trends of violence against groups, government, and UN

- Intentions , capabilities of perpetrators

- Dynamics of conflict

- Potential threats

- Priorities of information requirements

MPKI Cycle

Direction
Acquisition
Analysis
Dissemination

Direction

- Clear direction from leadership

- Prioritisation

- Drives Intelligence Requirements (IR) and Requests for Information (RFI)

- Based Commander's mission / intent

- Identifies intelligence gaps

Acquisition

- Data feed for the analytical step of cycle

- Collection of data and information from sources

- Involves identification, coordination, and tasking of assets

- Prioritization is key

- Some UN missions have dedicated assets

Analysis

- Direction
- Acquisition
- Dissemination
- **Analysis**

- Breaking down information into its component parts, examination to find interrelationships

- Data and information is converted into intelligence

- Review of information to assess reliability and credibility

- Grouping and recording of information for retrieval, comparison and evaluation

- Broken into:

    Collation

    Evaluation

    Analysis & Integration

    Interpretation

- Formatted intelligence products
- Decision making and planning
- Need to know / need to share
- Push pull system
- Must be timely, relevant, brief

Dissemination

Examples of standardised formats:
INTREP
INTSUM
Thematic
Flash Reports

MPKI Management

Mission Information Acquisition Plan (MIAP)- direction tool for MPKI cycle, changes per developing situations, acquisitions assets, execution orders

Intelligence Coordination Mechanism

Organisation

G2 Branch Structure

Roles/Responsibilities

- Produces timely, relevant, predictive intelligence

- Identifies trends

- Ensure Intel estimates are complete / current

- Conducts AOE and actor analysis

- Ensure a gender, POC and Force protection perspective in products

- Provided products to higher / subordinate HQs

Suggested S2 Structure

MPKI support to MDMP

MPKI supports the MDMP

Receipt of Mission

- Receipt of Mission Brief to leadership and staff

- What do we already know

- Collection assets and mapping products available

- Commander Intel guidance

  - PIRs/SIRs to initial IAP

  - Mission specific planning begins

- Start the analysis of the AOE

- Assist in developing Warning Order 1

Mission Analysis

- MPKI products for mission analysis

- Mission specific AOE done

- PIR confirmation

- "Phase One" brief

Warning Order 2 – Situation paragraph – if change / update from Warning Order 1

Mission Analysis-Phase One Brief

- After Receipt of Mission Brief / Early on in Mission Analysis

- Informs / situates commander and staff

- Mission specific, 45 minutes, key topics only

- AOE foundation – 'Golden Thread' products":

    – Physical, human, information terrain analysis

    – Actor evaluation

    – Situation integration with assessed ML/MD COAs

Example Phase One Brief – Template

Serial	Topic
01	Scope. Overview of what the Phase 1 Brief is going to cover and what briefing aids are going to be used.
02	Intelligence foundation. What intelligence the brief has been based on and inform the Commander of any intelligence gaps that are pertinent to the Mission.
03	Key assumptions and outputs. Inform the Commander of the key deductions and judgements you have identified from conducting AOE.
04	Ground in general. The Physical Terrain. Orientate the Commander and Planning Staff to the ground including weather effects.
05	Ground in detail. The Mission Specific Physical Terrain in more detail. Depending on the type of mission to be conducted (Defensive / Offensive), inform the Commander of the specific ground detail that will affect his/her mission including any key infrastructure.
06	Human and Information Terrains. Factors that are pertinent to the mission are likely to include: • Tribal and ethnic laydown • Displaced persons and refugees • NGOs • Key leaders • Pattern of life • HN armed forces • Infrastructure (Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academic, Refuge, Medical, Security, Other) • Information environment – social media trends (supportive/resistant to UN presence), media reporting, local communication capabilities.
07	Threat Evaluation. Analysis of all threat actors that are pertinent to the mission, to include: • Threat actor assumptions • Threat actor organisations and hierarchies including Key Leaders • Threat actor TTPs • Threat actor equipment and capabilities • Strengths and Weakness and Centre of Gravity Analysis
08 ★	Situation Integration. How will the threat actors and human factors affect the mission when considered in relation to the physical environment? To include: • Actors' Courses of Actions. Most Likely and Most Dangerous. • Updated Intelligence Acquisition Plan based on known intelligence gaps

Include Vital Intelligence

Physical Terrain Analysis

Human and Information Terrain Analysis

Actor and Threat Actor Evaluation

Situation Integration

COA Development

- MPKI supports planning team

- Confirm Actor's COAs
  - Most Likely
  - Most Dangerous

- Supports own forces COA brief

- Inputs from Phase One Brief / continuous AOE

- Supports COA analysis, relevant threat/actors

- Draft situation paragraph for WARNO 3

A Key MPKI Product That Supports Mission Analysis and COA Development

Product Examples

Ground in general – Mission specific

ROBOT or OCOKA are helpful- break the terrain down logically

Restricted Terrain

Ground in general – Known Routes / Avenues of Approach

Ground in detail – Mission specific

Ground in detail – Mission specific

Information Terrain – Mission specific

How do population communicate?
How robust is this network?
How secure is it?
How does it affect our mission?

Human Terrain – Mission specific

Ethnographics Sector East

Tribal Breakdown

Pie chart legend: Tutu, Eri, Abu, Sunka, Nimba

Human Terrain – Mission specific

Where could the actor get its support?
Which areas are permissive to UN?

Human Terrain – Mission specific

Any complexities that could affect our mission?
Movement through the town e.g. pattern of life activity?
Situation within IDP camp?
HN Security Force laydown?

Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
Weather type	☀	🌤	☁	🌧	🌧
Max Temp °C / °F	27°C / 81°F	24°C / 75°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F
Min Temp °C / °F	17°C / 63°F	16°C / 61°F	12°C / 54°F	11°C / 52°F	11°C / 52°F
Clouds	Clear	Scattered	Broken	Overcast - Rain	Overcast - Rain
Precipitation	0 – 15 mm	0 – 15 mm	0 – 15 mm	225 – 290 mm	250 – 300 mm
Humidity	25 %	25 %	60 %	75 %	75 %
Wind direction	SW ↗	SW ↗	SE ↖	E ←	E ←
Sunrise and set	06.07 / 18.58 hour LT	06.08 / 18.59 hour LT	06.09 / 19.00 hour LT	06.10 / 19.01 hour LT	06.11 / 19.02 hour LT
Moonrise and set	20.26 / 07.47 hour LT	21.04 / 08.33 hour LT	21.37 / 09.19 hour LT	22.17 / 10.04 hour LT	22.57 / 10.51 hour LT
Illumination % night	Illumination 88.5 %	Illumination 81.6 %	Illumination 73.4 %	Illumination 64.1 %	Illumination 53.9 %

Weather effects matrix

Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
UN Personnel				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
UN Material				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
Rotary wing & MV				Visibility	visibility
Fixed wing - transport				Visibility and wind	visibility
UAV				Visibility & wind	Visibility & rain
Movements (roads)				Flooding risk	Flooding risk
Movements (off-road)					Condition & Flooding
Communications				Distance reduction	Distance reduction
Specific effects on UN Operating Environment		NSTR	NSTR	DPRE / Flooding	DPRE / Flooding risk NCAG / TERR IED
Legend:	Non-assessable / NSTR	Favorable	Marginal	Unfavorable	

How does it affect the mission?
What pertinent detail is included here?

Actor Evaluation – Mission specific

- **Known locations? Are they assessed locations?**
- **Known numbers?**
- **How old is the data that forms the basis of that assessment?**

Actor Evaluation – IK

- **What is the important data? Who is important and why?**
- **How does the leader maintain control and deliver orders?**
- **Has this organisation changed due to the success of UN missions?**

IK – COWARD Table – Key Takeaways

Capability	Organisation	Weapons + Equipment	Asymmetric TTPs	Reinforcement / Logistics	Dispositions / Doctrine
Little is known about its key leaders, but the 'Nimr' (NFDK) is known to be the overall military leader.	Katibats – operating in respective clan areas	Small Arms – AK variants. Sophisticated Sniper capability SIEDs	Hit and run ambush attacks against host nation security forces	Each Katibat has a religious and military leader.	Standard insurgent / guerrilla TTPs.
religious leaders to deliver propagandistic sermons targeting its enemies

Limited campaign given size of grouping

No evidence of capability to conduct a spectacular | IK has a decentralized leadership model, with key leaders – of which little in known - based in Abusir;

Katibats don't operate as a single entity – each comprises sub-groups.

Excellent COMSEC | use females in SPBIEDs

SVBIEDs | IK not capable of large-scale conventional operations against UNMIGAR or the GAF.

IK asymmetric attack capabilities have increased as a result of the recent influx of combat-hardened Jihadist fighters from the 6th Continent | Support from population who believe in their ideology.

the group utilizes caches of weapons, hidden on both sides of the border, enabling personnel to evade detection at GAF checkpoints | Unlikely to surrender |

Key Takeaway
RPG-7 could be used in SA role (800m range). Threat to UN aviation and light-armour.

300M   500M 700M   1300M

4000M

SWOT – Mission specific

Strengths

- COMSEC
- Local knowledge
- Decentralised Leadership
- Reputation and propaganda

Weakness

- Requirement for religious justification
- Physical Terrain
- Local support not guaranteed
- Composition
- Capability

Opportunities

- Weak Host Nation Security Forces
- Expanding Links with the AWF
- Lack of formal economic opportunities
- Structural causes of the conflict

Threats

- Deployment of UNIGAR
- Coalition between regional partners
- International CT operations

Centre of Gravity: Support of the population

Situation Integration
MPKI Products that Support COA Development

(Examples)

IK will conduct harassment ATTACKs and widespread DISRUPTion activity in order to ISOLATE UN forces.

Depicts MOST LIKELY

Intent/Purpose.

DISRUPT UN activity without becoming decisively engaged. UNDERMINE UN presence within the Sector.

MSN. Conduct small arms ATTACK on UN bases IOT REINFORCE their IO campaign.

Endstate. UN being forced to increase security at its bases makes UN a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

Scheme of Manoeuvre:

Shaping:

- Hate speeches. UN as the target.
- Small teams will forward mount to urban areas to prepare.
- Surveillance of UN base and UN force movements.

Decisive:

- Once recce screen is in place, the attack teams will move forward to conduct attack.
- Use of VHF radios to control the attacks. Assessed firing point will be from southern edge of urban area.
- Attack will last NMT 5-10 minutes as per previous attacks. Wpns will be dropped or taken to local caches.

Sustaining:

- Teams will withdraw before decisively engaged using terrain to cover movement.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UN credibility.

I & W:

- Increase in anti-UN propaganda.
- Increased surveillance of UN TOBs;
- Testing of UN security procedures involving unarmed personnel by day and night;
- Significant change to pattern of life in and around UN bases;

IHI:

- Weapons caches;
- Sniper rifles

Weaknesses

- VHF radios can be intercepted.

Strengths

- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

Tactical Functions:

1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – Sniper rifles (U/K variant) and AK47 variants.
4. Manoeuvre – Urban – use of motorbikes, light role.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Use of population and hides to secure lethal aid.

Event Overlay – Decision Support

- **Explain to Commander the pertinent NAIs and TAIs – what are they identifying or trying to affect? Which COA?**
- **NAIs / TAIs to be recorded in IAP**
- **Must have detailed description**

COA Development – Vetting UN Mission Pillars

COA = operational Success

Humanitarian

Political

Security

MPKI supports Vetting COAs against impacts to the Political and Humanitarian goals and objectives

UN Mandate

A military successful operation at the tactical level may impact negatively on a humanitarian or political operational or strategic objective; higher HQs / commander should endorse and approve tactical plans

Orders Production & Execution

- MPKI guidance on control measures

- De-confliction of acquisition and operational activities

- Situation paragraph, peacekeeping-intelligence annex

- Supports staff branch annexes

- Supports Mission Rehearsal – raise scenarios and contingencies (Red-teaming / war-gaming)

- During Execution phase- Intel cells monitor situation / refines products, makes changes and adjusts information requirements as situation on the ground changes, supports a new planning cycle as required

Take Away

- Threat-based assessments drive and influence tactical planning

- Mission analysis of threats is a critical step for assessment of perpetrators, civilians and other protection actors

- Risk analysis guides prioritisation of threats

- MPKI cycle is the process by which MPKI is acquired, analyzed and disseminated based on clearly identified requirements

- MPKI management tools ensure effective intelligence support to military decision-making process

- MPKI support for the MDMP provides inputs to be integrated during all phases of the planning process

Questions?

Lesson 3.3 Tactical Planning Considerations for the Protection of Civilians (POC)

Content

- UNIBAT Implementing guidelines

- Phases of response and use of force

- POC Tactical decision-making process considerations

Learning Outcomes

- Explain why the myriad of POC guidelines are important to the UNIBAT commander and staff

- Give examples of Do's and Don'ts when engaging communities

- Explain the phases of response and why they are important

- Identify key aspects in a threat assessment for POC

- Explain how POC considerations impact tactical planning

Perspectives

The Mission POC strategy provides the operational level guidance to allow the component HQs to draft tactical plans and orders that will ultimately affect the UNIBATs

Guidance for Tactical Level Commanders

- Planning at sector and unit level

- Conduct of POC tasks/operations

- Early Warning

- Engaging communities

Planning at sector and unit level

- Production of own POC plans and contingency plans based on directives from higher level

- POC intent of higher command reflected

POC Operations

- 4 phases of operations

- Presence and posture

- Reporting on all threats, including Child Protection and CRSV concerns

- Adherence to ROE

POC Operations

Do

- Intervene when armed elements or criminals are threatening civilians
- Prioritize actions to prevent and halt violence
- Distinguish between civilians and combatants
- Ensure your protection efforts support existing community mechanisms as much as possible
- Coordinate your actions with other components of the mission (police and civilian)
- Treat all civilians with dignity and respect and abide by the Code of Conduct

Conduct of POC Operations
Child Protection Considerations

Do

- Assist child soldiers when they surrender or get captured
- Inform CP Unit and hand over to nearest CP actor as soon as possible
- Share CP techniques / humanitarian framework / knowledge with host state military
- Encourage host state military not to use schools as bases

Don't

- Send children away and tell them to come back the next day after you informed CP Unit
- Hand children over to host state army without consulting CP Unit
- Underestimate your role as role model
- Use schools as bases

Early Warning

- Situational awareness and early warning indicators

- Outreach and advocacy

- Early Warning Centers

  – Information hub in POB and TOB

  – Produce database including threats and vulnerabilities

  – Manage cell phone hotline

  – Maintain information collection plan

Engaging Communities

Regular interaction, liaison, consultation with communities, local leaders

UNIBAT Engagement Platoon (EP)

Community Alert Networks (CAN)

Community Liaison Assistants (CLA)

Joint Protection Teams (JPT)

Cultural Awareness Teams (CAT)

Engaging Communities

Do

- Ensure safety and security of interlocutors
- Know your mandate
- Act as a role model
- Report through the chain of command and focal points
- Collect evidence
- Assist survivors of child abuse and sexual violence
- Respect dignity and confidentiality
- Know referral arrangements

Engaging Communities

Do

- Obtain informed consent
- Think of creative community outreach options
- Work with local NGOs and communities
- Consider possible consequences of your actions for local communities
- Ask for guidance if uncertain

Engaging Communities

Don't

- Interview
- Follow-up or investigate
- Share with authorities details of victims of human rights violations
- Take pictures of child victims
- Act on behalf of victims without informed consent
- Engage in activities that may harm local communities

Engaging Communities

Don't

- Be discouraged if you cannot help immediately
- Be discouraged if you think the mission should do more to help
- Casually spend time with children
- Give money, food or employment to children
- Have any sexual contact with children

Phases of Response and Use of Force

Phases of Response Exercise

Prevention

Pre-emption

Response

Consolidation

These are more proactive – Plans to reduce likelihood

These are more reactive – Plans to reduce negative effects

Phases of Response

| Prevention | Pre-emption | Response | Consolidation |

For instance
- Presence, patrols, force deployments
- Mediation and conflict prevention
- Advocacy, key leader outreach
- Human rights monitoring and reporting

Phases of Response

| Prevention | Pre-emption | Response | Consolidation |

For instance
- Increased patrolling and information gathering
- Ensure military and police presence; intercept, neutralise or defuse hostile acts; QRF/SF or Force Reserve
- Political pressure; intensified communication with armed actors and potential parties to the conflict
- Human rights monitoring and reporting

Phases of Response

Prevention	Pre-emption	Response	Consolidation

For instance
- Offensive and defensive military operations
- Inter-positioning of troops
- Swift action through the speedy movement of forces such as attack helicopters, QRFs and reconnaissance
- Mitigation of suffering; evacuation
- Human rights monitoring and reporting
- Support delivery of humanitarian aid

Phases of Response

Prevention	Pre-emption	Response	Consolidation

For instance
- Mediation and stabilisation post-crisis
- Protection and reassurance
- Readjust security
- Collection of evidence and human rights investigations
- Support delivery of humanitarian aid

Phases of Response

| Prevention | Pre-emption | Response | Consolidation |

UNIBAT / Infantry COY Tasks

- Patrolling
- Observation post
- Checkpoint
- Outreach and engagement
- Situational awareness
- Cordon and search
- Convoy and escort
- Operation Base

- Security for DDR site
- Critical infrastructure security
- Joint operations
- Coordination / Engagement
- Reinforce / relief
- Evacuate

Graduated Use of Force

Use of Force Continuum

Important!
The specific details in this chart are for illustrative purpose only. Military units must tailor the details of their mission-specific requirements, equipment and level of training.

Level of Force	Threat Actions	UN Action/Reaction
DEADLY FORCE	**ASSAULTIVE (SERIOUS/FATAL ACTION)** · Threat uses weapons, undertakes life threatening weaponless assault, and/or disarms a military/police	**LETHAL** · Use of firearm and strike to vital areas
NON-DEADLY FORCE	**ASSAULTIVE (NON LIFE THREATENING)** · Threat conducts non-life threatening activities but has the potential to cause physical harm to peacekeepers/civilians, e.g.: stone throwing, use of incendiary devices, sabotage. **RESISTANT (ACTIVE)** · Threat wrestles/pushes military/police or pulls away **RESISTANT (PASSIVE)** · Threat is unresponsive (refuses to move dead weight) or exhibits danger cues	**DEFENSIVE TACTICS** · Use riot control equipment including shield, water canon, soft kinetic projectiles, etc. **COMPLIANCE TECHNIQUES** · Use chemical irritant application, riot control agents/barricades/cordon/show of forces including aviation. **CONTACT CONTROLS** · Takedowns, handcuffs, threat of using force.
AUTHORITATIVE PRESENCE	**COMPLIANT** · Threat shows positive or cooperative behavior	**COOPERATIVE CONTROL** · Physical appearance, verbal command, search techniques and apprehension tactics

Tactical decision-making process considerations

POC Planning Considerations

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
Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Mission Mandate

CONOPS

Mission POC Strategy

Mission POC Plan

Force Commander OPORD

Sector Commander OPORD

Receipt of mission

Mission Analysis

1. ## Identification of Key Actors
   a. Civilian population
   b. Potential perpetrators
   c. Host State security forces
   d. Other protection actors

2. ## Threat Analysis
   a. Overview
   b. Key Elements
   c. Matrix

3. ## Risk Analysis
   a. Vulnerability assessment
   b. Protection actor capability assessment
   c. Danger level assessment
   d. Risk analysis matrix

Course of Action (CoA)

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

CoAs aim to reduce or eliminate the risk.

Development of CoAs are considered under each of the four phases of response.

Civilian casualties and collateral damage must be considered rigorously.

1. Plans to reduce the likelihood of violence

2. Plans to reduce the impact violence

3. Resources support synchronization with mission components

4. Coordination with protection actors

5. Consultation with communities at risk

Order Production

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Plans must be approved by the FHQ, SHQ, or Brigade Commander

1. Approval of plans
2. Production of OPORD
3. Sub-units DMP
4. Rehearsals
5. Plans and orders adjustments and updates

Execution

Execution of POC operations are triggered by different circumstances and always considers the Host State security forces capabilities and intention to protect.

1. Early warning mechanisms
2. Local community alert networks
3. Monitoring of armed groups
4. Instructions from S/FHQ
5. Decision of the commander on scene, reasonable belief
6. AAR and reporting of the outcome of the operation

Receipt of Mission
↓
Mission analysis
↓
Course of action
↓
Orders production
↓
Execution

Let us Focus on Mission Analysis

Priority Information Requirements (PIR) are established.

Patrols and recce operations are conducted.

Information is requested from and offered to the mission intelligence mechanism and protection actors.

Key actors
Civilian populations

1. Pinpoint location and area of movements

2. Determine:
   - Number of civilians by gender and age
   - Ethnicity, religion and political affiliation
   - Type of the settlement
   - Facilities of tactical importance
   - Self-protection mechanisms
   - Historical background

3. Identify the local leaders

Key actors

Civilian populations

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

A

B

Military Units

C

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

Key actors
Civilian populations

For each civilian population identified within the unit's AOR.

Civilian Population	Location	Number Children Gender	Ethnicity Religion Political	Schools	Hospitals	Markets
Community A						
Community B						
Community C						

Priority Information Requirements (PIR) are established.

Patrols and recce operations are conducted.

Information is requested from and offered to the mission intelligence mechanism and protection actors

Key actors
Potential Perpetrators

1. Pinpoint location and area of influence or operations

2. Determine:
   - Number, composition and C2
   - Ethnicity, religion and political affiliation
   - Hostile intent and historical background
   - Capabilities
   - Use of child soldiers

3. Identify the leaders

Key actors
Potential Perpetrators

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

X
X
Y
Z
Military Units

Potential Perpetrators

| Receipt of Mission |
| Mission analysis |
| Course of action |
| Orders production |
| Execution |

For each armed group within the unit's AOR

Group	Location	Number	Composition	C2
Perpetrator X				
Perpetrator Y				
Perpetrator Z				

Ethnicity Religion Political	Intent	Capabilities	Historical Background	Use of Child Soldiers

Host Nation Security Forces

Process diagram

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Notes (left margin)

Priority Information Requirements (PIR) are established.

Patrols and recce operations are conducted.

Information is requested from and offered to the mission intelligence mechanism and protection actors

Main content

1. Pinpoint location and area of influence or operations

2. Determine:
   - Number, composition and C2
   - Ethnicity, religion and political affiliation
   - Capability and will to protect civilians
   - Human rights records
   - Use of child soldiers

3. Identify the leaders

Key actors
Host Nation Security Forces

Receipt of Mission				
Mission analysis				
Course of action				
Orders production				
Execution				

For each Host State security forces unit deployed within the unit's AOR

HNSF	Location	Number	Composition	C2
HNSF X				
HNSF Y				
HNSF Z				

Ethnicity Religion Political	Capabilities	Will	HR Violations	Use of child soldiers

Other Protection Actors

| Receipt of Mission |
| Mission analysis |
| Course of action |
| Orders production |
| Execution |

This may include: UN and non-UN humanitarian actors, int'l or national NGOs, and other UNSC mandated international forces.

Existing coordination mechanisms will facilitate acquisition of relevant information.

1. Pinpoint location and area of influence or operations

2. Determine:
   - Mandate and capabilities
   - Their capacity and will to support peacekeeping operations
   - Their dependence on peacekeeping support

3. Identify the existing coordination mechanisms with the mission

Key actors
Other Protection Actors

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

For each Host State security forces unit deployed within the unit's AOR

Other protection actors	Location	Mandate	Capabilities	Support capacity
Protection Actor A				
Protection Actor B				
Protection Actor C				

Threat analysis
Overview

Killings are always assumed a threat when other threats of physical violence are identified

1. Priority consideration to threats identified at the mission level

2. Additional threats identified at the unit's AOR

For each threat determine:

- Situation and type of threat (What)
- Potential perpetrators (Who)
- Potentially affected population (Whom)
- Areas where civilians may be targeted (Where)
- Days and time of day attacks are most likely (When)
- Motivation behind threat (Why)
- Possible movements and tactics of the armed groups (How)

Threat analysis
Key Elements

Receipt of Mission → Mission analysis → Course of action → Orders production → Execution

For each civilian population and armed group within the unit's AOR

Civilian Population **A**	**Ethnical**	**Religious**	**Political**	**Others**
Armed Group **X**	**Concern**	**Concern**	----	**Concern**
Armed Group **Y**	**Concern**	----	**Concern**	----
Armed Group **Z**	----	----	----	----

Threat analysis
Matrix

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

For each identified threat

What	Who	Whom	Where	When	Why	How
Threat **1**	Perpetrator X	Community A	Lat-Lon	PM	Political	Possible maneuver
Threat **2**	Perpetrator X	Community B	Lat-Lon	Day	Religious	Possible maneuver
Threat **3**	Perpetrator X	Community C	Lat-Lon	Night	Ethnical	Possible maneuver
Threat **4**	Perpetrator Y	Community A	Lat-Lon	Working Hours	Conduct operations	Possible maneuver
Threat **5**	Perpetrator Y	Community B	Lat-Lon	School Hours	Retaliation	Possible maneuver

Risk analysis
Vulnerability assessment

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

For each civilian population unit's AOR towards each identified threat

Threat 1	Number	W	Childr	Settlement	Schools	Hospitals
CP **A**	320	78%	42%	Rudimentary	none	none
CP **B**	10,000	54%	34%	Developed	2	2
CP **C**	1,300	68%	45%	IDP Camp	1	1

| Receipt of Mission |
| Mission analysis |
| Course of action |
| Orders production |
| Execution |

Risk analysis

Protection actors capability assessment

For each protection actor within the unit's AOR towards each identified threat

Threat 1	Intention to protect	Distance Vs. mobility	Overall Capability	UNPK support
Protection Actor 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Protection Actor 1	No	Yes	Yes	No
Protection Actor 1	?	No	Yes	No

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Risk analysis
Danger level assessment

For each armed group within the unit's AOR towards each identified threat

Threat #	Intention	Capability	Historical Background
Armed Group **X**	**High**	**High**	**High**
Armed Group **Y**	**Medium**	**High**	**Low**
Armed Group **Z**	**Low**	**Medium**	**Low**

Risk analysis Matrix

Receipt of Mission → Mission analysis → Course of action → Orders production → Execution

For each identified threat

What	Who	Whom	Where	When	Why	How
Threat 1	Perpetrator X	Community A	Lat-Lon	PM	Political	Possible maneuver
Threat 2	Perpetrator X	Community B	Lat-Lon	Day	Religious	Possible maneuver
Threat 3	Perpetrator X	Community C	Lat-Lon	Night	Ethnical	Possible maneuver
Threat 4	Perpetrator Y	Community A	Lat-Lon	Working Hours	Conduct operations	Possible maneuver
Threat 5	Perpetrator Y	Community B	Lat-Lon	School Hours	Retaliation	Possible maneuver

impact

likelihood

High

Medium

Low

Projected Protection Site

- Part of TOB Defense Plan
- Part of POC plan
- To prevent population from entering TOB during crises
- Main Features:
  - Close to TOB
  - Easy access
  - Within defense capabilities
  - Coordination with local leaders

Take Away

- Implementing guidelines provide guidance for strategic, operational and tactical levels are found in a myriad of mission documents

- Robust presence, posture and early warning are key factors for success

- Ensure sensitivity to Child Protection and CRSV threats and challenges

- The four phases of response are not sequential and are categories of activities providing protection from physical violence

- Use of force training is essential

- Mission analysis is a critical step for assessment of perpetrators, civilians and other protection actors

- Plans need to be approved and risks underwritten by higher command

- Risk analysis guides prioritization of threats

- Consultation and liaison with other mission and non-mission actors is critical

Lesson 3.4 Tactical Planning Considerations for Force Protect (FP)

Content

- Definitions

- Planning tools and guidelines

- The use of phases and the use of force

- Tactical planning considerations

- Base defense planning considerations

- IED

- UNSMS

Learning Objectives

- Explain FP and its importance to the UNIBAT

- Explain using phases as a tool / consideration for planning FP

- Identify key aspects in the FP threat-based assessment; and why the risk assessment helps prioritize planning efforts

- Explain why all military operations must consider FP

- Describe measures to mitigate IED risks

- Explain UNSMS and how might the UNIBAT support

Force Protection (FP)

- Cyclic process
- Detecting threats
- Assessing risks, applying mitigation measures
- Preserve freedom of action for operational effectiveness
- Contributes to mission success

A robust threat and risk analysis is the foundation

Definitions & Terminology Review

Perpetrator: Actors to attempt, manifest or cause harm

Protection: preservation from injury, harm by person, thing

Security: protection against intentional damages

Safety: protection against non-intentional accidental / hazard events

Vulnerability: weakness which makes one susceptible to harm

Hazard: potential cause of harm from non-deliberate a action / acts of nature

Difference between the two

THREAT — Things that could harm us

RISK — Likelihood of being harmed by THREAT and impact of it

FP Rationale

_____

- A core function / consideration for all ops

- Preserve freedom of movement and action

- Critical in adapting and understanding threats

- Systematic / cyclic approach for risk mitigation

- Security / FP a culture in most combat units especially for Infantry Battalions

Tactical FP Planning

- MPKI, threat / risk analysis drive the planning

- Higher command intent

- FP is inherent / incorporated in all UNIBAT mission planning

- Action vs inaction

- Coordinate with others

FP Tactical Planning Considerations – Use of Phases

Tactical Planning Considerations- Use of Phases

Prevention	Preemption	React / Actions on Contact	Consolidation

- Robust presence, active patrolling
- Conflict prevention / coordination / engagement
- Advocacy, outreach
- Coordination and assistance from Mission's civilian components

Tactical Planning Considerations- Use of Phases

Prevention · **Preemption** · **React / Actions on Contact** · **Consolidation**

- Increased information gathering, show of force

- Ensure military and police presence; intercept, defuse potential issues execute

- Force Reserve, reposition of forces where required

- Political pressure; intensified communication with potential perpetrators

**General Cruz DPO Report-
A proactive approach is taking "Action vs In-Action"**

Tactical Planning Considerations- Use of Phases

Prevention

Preemption

React / Actions on Contact

Consolidation

ROE Drives Action

- Actions on contact / Battle Drills to **neutralise** threats of violence

- Re-positioning movement of units / troops and weapon systems

- Defensive tasks

- QRF, attack helicopters, Reinforcements

- Medical aid, mitigate damage; evacuation

- Support delivery of aid to others

Tactical Planning Considerations-Use of Phases

Prevention	Preemption	React / Actions on Contact	Consolidation

For instance
- Stabilisation post-crisis
- Protection and reassurance
- Re-adjust security
- Support delivery of aid

UNIBAT FP Risk Mitigation

Prevention

Preemption

React / Actions on Contact

Consolidation

- Effective MPKI cycle
- Situational awareness
- Planning
- Robust Patrolling
- Liaison, coordination, engagement, outreach
- Active reconnaissance
- Base defense

- High state of training and equipment readiness
- Physical security
- Joint Civil / host nation military operations
- Reinforcement plans / QRF
- Rehearsed -Actions on Contact (Reaction/ Battle Drills)

FP Tactical Planning- Considerations, Guidance & Tools for a PKO

Receipt of Mission

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Order's production

Execution

Mission Mandate

CONOPS

Mission FP Strategy

Mission FP Plan

Force Commander OPORD

Sector Commander OPORD

Receipt of mission

Guidance

- Collect DPO Guidance Materials:
  - UNHQ Strategic/Operational Estimates
  - Technical Assessment Report
  - Secretary General's Report
  - Rules of Engagement
  - Integrated Strategic Framework
  - Mission Concept
  - CONOPS
  - HQMC Directive
  - Troop Contributing Country (TCC) Guidelines
  - Input from other Programmes & Agencies
- Study initial assessment of OE
- *Prepare/update staff estimates**
- *Conduct quick time estimate**
- *Issue initial warning order**

Mission Analysis

Within the unit's Area of Responsibility (AOR)

1. ## Identification of Key Actors
   a. UN Forces / UN and International populations
   b. Potential perpetrators
   c. Host State security forces
   d. Other protection actors

2. ## Threat Analysis
   a. Overview
   b. Key Elements
   c. Matrix

: UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Cycle

3. ## Risk Analysis
   a. Operational UN bases with forces
   b. UN forces concentrations /routine areas of operations
   c. Vulnerability / physical security assessment
   d. Protection actor capability assessment
   e. Danger level assessment
   f. Risk analysis matrix
   g. Areas of concentrations of UN / International personnel

Key Actors
UN Force and UN / International Personnel

1. Pinpoint location and areas

2. Determine:

   - Number of UN forces in areas, along routes
   - Type of routine military operations, frequency, and density
   - UN operating bases with forces
   - TOBs / Observation posts
   - FP / base defense mechanisms
   - UN or Host country facilities or infrastructure guarded by UN forces (example Airfield)
   - Potential areas of UN Force employment- UN / International personnel concentrations….example: WFP storage areas, DDR sites etc.

UN forces and UN facilities with UN forces

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

TOB
A
B
C
Routine (daily) UN Military convoy
WFP Warehouse complex
D

Note: Do not forget UNMOs; often live in local communities

UN Forces /Potential Force Employments

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

For each location identified within the unit's AOR

UN Force	Location	Number personnel	Ethnicity Religion TCC History w/ Population	Type unit	Type of base	Operation
A						
B						
C						

UN / Int. Site	Location	Number personnel	Organisation	History w/ population and UN Forces	Base	Type of Activity
D						
E						
F						

Host State Security Forces

Receipt of Mission
↓
Mission analysis
↓
Course of action
↓
Orders production
↓
Execution

Priority Information Requirements (PIR) are established.

Patrols and recce operations are conducted.

Information is requested from and offered to the mission intelligence mechanism and protection actors

1. Pinpoint location and area of influence or operations

2. Determine:

    - Number, composition and C2
    - Ethnicity, religion and political affiliation
    - Capability and will to support and or assist in the protection of UN forces
    - Human rights records
    - Use of child soldiers

3. Identify the leaders

Key actors
Host State Security Forces

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

For each Host State security forces unit deployed within the unit's AOR

HSSF	Location	Number	Composition	C2
X				
Y				
Z				

Ethnicity Religion Political	Capabilities	Will	HR Violations	Use of child soldiers

Other Protection Actors

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

This may include UN and non-UN actors, int'l or national and other UNSC mandated international forces

Existing coordination mechanisms will facilitate acquisition of relevant information

1. Pinpoint location and area of influence or operations

2. Determine:
   - Mandate and capabilities
   - Their capacity and will to support peacekeeping operations
   - Their dependence on peacekeeping support

3. Identify the existing coordination mechanisms with the mission

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Key actors

Other Protection Actors

Other protection actor

UN Military Unit

Other protection actor

Other Protection Actors

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

For each security force deployed within the unit's AOR

Other protection actors	Location / time to assist	Mandate	Capabilities	Support capacity
Protection Actor A				
Protection Actor B				
Protection Actor C				

Potential Perpetrators

Receipt of Mission

**Mission analysis**

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Information Requirements are established.

Patrols and recce operations are conducted.

Information is requested from and offered to the mission intelligence mechanism and protection actors

1. Pinpoint location and area of influence or operations

2. Determine:

   - Number, composition and their leadership / C2

   - Affiliations, ethnic, political, religion

   - Hostile intent, historical background towards the UN / UN forces / TCC country / host nation security forces, force religion ethnicity differences or friction points

   - Capabilities

3. Identify the leaders

Key actors
Potential Perpetrators

| Receipt of Mission |
| Mission analysis |
| Course of action |
| Orders production |
| Execution |

For each potential perpetrator / group within the unit's AOR

	Location	Number	Composition	C2
Perpetrator X				
Perpetrator Y				
Perpetrator Z				

Ethnicity Religion Political	Intent / motivation	Capabilities	Historical Background	Use of Child Soldiers

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

Threat analysis
Overview

1. Priority consideration of threats identified at the mission level

2. Additional threats identified at the unit's AOR

Violent attacks on any UN agency are a a threat / potential perpetrator

For each threat determine:

- Situation and type of threat (What)
- Potential perpetrators (Who)
- Potentially UN Force or operation affected (Whom)
- Areas where the UN military may be targeted (Where)
- Days and time of day attacks are most likely (When)
- Motivation behind perpetrators threat of violence (Why)
- Possible movements and tactics by perpetrators (How)

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Threat analysis
Key Elements

For each Perpetrator / armed group within the unit's AOR

	Ethnical Religious	Historical	Political	Other
Perpetrator **X**	**Concern**	**Concern**	----	**Concern**
Perpetrator **y**	**Concern**	----	**Concern**	----
Perpetrator **z**	----	----	----	----

Threat analysis
Matrix

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

For each identified perpetrator / threat

Who	What	To Whom	Where	When	Why	How
Perpetrator X (farmers)	Rock throwing	Unit A	Route Yellow	AM	Crop damage by UN	Roadblock barricade
Perpetrator X	Sniper fire	DDR site Unit B Security Element	XYZ	DDR site opens	Political / group not accepting Cease fire	Harassing women and UN tries to intervene
Perpetrator y	Small arms fire	UN forces-Security detail	WFP Warehouse	Night	Disrupt aide flow	Small cal. Fire at OP
Perpetrator Y	RPG	Unit C	CP at XYZ	1st Light	Retaliation	Raid to target UN veh
Perpetrator Z	IED	Unit D convoys	XYZ	Night	Religious and ethical	Routine route UN forces travel

Risk analysis
Vulnerability assessment

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

For each UN Force /UN base with forces / TOB / Routine Operation site for UN forces in unit's AOR towards each identified perpetrator threat

UNIT / Site	Readiness Training & Equip & night ops	C 3	Capabilities Armor or LT Vehs	FP / Defence Planning	QRF	Physical Security Assessment
A						
B						
C						

Risk analysis

Protection actors capability assessment

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

For each protection actor within the unit's AOR towards each identified threat

Threat 1	Intention to protect	Distance Vs. mobility	Overall Capability	UNPK support
Protection Actor 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Protection Actor 1	No	Yes	Yes	No
Protection Actor 1	?	No	Yes	No

Risk analysis
Danger level assessment

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

For each perpetrator within the unit's AOR towards each identified threat

Perpetrator	Intention	Capability	Historical Background
X	High	High	High
Y	Medium	High	Low
Z	Low	Medium	Low

Course of Action (CoA)

CoAs aim to reduce, neutralize, or eliminate the risk.

Development of CoAs are considered under phases and

ROE / Collateral damage must be considered

1. Plans to reduce the likelihood

2. Plans to reduce / mitigate impact to neutralise the threat / perpetrator

3. Resources support synchronisation with mission components

4. Coordination with protection actors

5. Coordinate - UN forces, UN bases with military forces, other protectors

6. Vet COAs via UN mission pillars – impact to- political, humanitarian, security; view of UN, information operations, media

Execution

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Execution of FP, security and defensive operations are triggered by different circumstances and always considers the Host State security forces capabilities and intention to protect

1. Early warning mechanisms
2. Alert networks
3. Monitoring perpetrators
4. Higher HQs order approval process and supported by
5. CONPLANS Rehearsal- example QRFs
6. Decision of the commander on scene; actions on contact to neutralise
7. AAR and reporting

Another Tactical Planning Tool for Consideration

Life Cycle of an Operation

ASSESS

PREPARE

PLAN

COMMANDER

ASSESS

EXECUTE

ASSESS

Life Cycle of an Operation

ASSESS

PREPARE

PLAN

COMMANDER

ASSESS

ASSESS

EXECUTE

Life Cycle of an Operation

Life Cycle of an Operation

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)

IED

- Placed or fabricated

- Improvised manner

- Destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals

- To destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract

- May incorporate military stores

- normally devised from non-military components

IED Safety and Best Practice

IED indicators use - AWARE

Atmospherics

Warning Signs

Aiming Markers

Recognise Ground Signs

Examine surrounding for items out of place

IED Indicators / Ground Signs

- **Ground Sign, most essential indicators**
- **Evidence of change from natural state**
- **Emplacement & concealment leaves signs**

IED Warning and Aiming Markers

Warning Marker

Aiming Marker

- **Different warning markers**
- **Used by locals / terrorists to warn population**
- **Aiming markers- to initiate IED accurately at intended target**

Avoid Setting Patterns

Attackers are quick to exploit patterns being set

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday IED Attack

In today's asymmetric environment the UN forces are specifically targeted

Avoid Setting Patterns

Vary departure times, locations and stops

Avoid patterns and always do a risk assessment / analysis before traveling

Actions on Finding an IED

STOP DO NOT APPROACH

DO NOT TOUCH

Actions- 5Cs

Confirm

Clear

Cordon

Control

Call

Take Away

- Use the tools and considerations as guidance to help plan for FP in a PKO

- Robust posture and early warning are key to FP success

- Use phases as a tool in planning, they are not sequential and can be understood as categories of activities providing protection / neutralization of threats

- In mission analysis, the assessment of perpetrators and consider other protection actors

- Risk analysis help guide the planning efforts in prioritization of threats

- Plans need to be approved by higher command

- Consultation / coordination with mission and non-mission actors

- Use of Force training is essential

- IEDs are significant threats ; components-SPIC; IED signs; use AWARE

Questions

Lesson 3.5
Planning Considerations for PKO
Tasks in Support of the Mandate

Content

- Select UNIBAT PKO tasks
- Planning considerations
- Patrolling
- Liaison / Coordination / Engagement
- Cordon and Search (C&S)
- Convoy Escort
- DDR support
- Observation point (OP)
- Check Point
- Establish Temporary Operating base (TOB)

Learning Outcome

- Describe types of specialised PKO UNIBAT tasks that facilitate others to support the execution of the mandate

- Explain how these tasks impact tactical planning

- Describe inappropriate tasks for the UNIBAT

- Describe planning considerations for conducting liaison, coordination and engagements

- Describe types of patrols; explain why patrols need a purpose

- Describe the primary purposes for C&S, Check Points, OPs

- List the possible DDR tasks for a UNIBAT

- Explain the purpose of a TOB and key planning considerations

Conduct of Tasks

- There are a set of select military tasks that are associated with a UNPKO to facilitate the mandate execution for mission components, UN stakeholders

- MDMP / threat based, planning at tactical level and approved by higher command

- May conduct several tasks for one mission / operation

- Close coordination with stakeholders

- Adherence to FP / POC strategies

Nested Strategies and Tasks

UN Mission

3 Pillars- Support UN Mandate

- Secure
- Humanitarian
- Political
- FP / POC Strategy

MC/ FHQs

- Secure / Security
- FP Operations- security
- POC Operations- security

Remember- MC chief agent of the security pillar

Sector HQs

INF BN

- **Offensive Ops**
- **Defensive Ops**
- **PKO Tasks Supporting Mandate**

Supports MC's - FP / POC Frameworks

INF COY -Defend / Attack Tactical tasks and PKO tasks in support of mandate

Select PKO Tasks in Support of the Mandate

- Patrolling

- Liaison and coordination

- Conduct Convoy escort (C&S)

- Cordon and Search

- DDR support

- Observation point (OP)

- Check Point

- Establish TOB

All MPKI and MDMP driven

UNIBAT / INF COY- Inappropriate Missions / Tasks

Hostages Radisson Hotel, Bamako, Mali

Normally not capable, trained, equipped for:

- Hostage rescue operations

- Military assistance

- Personal Security Detachment tasks

- Special Forces (SF) type operations / task

- Crowd control unless properly trained and equipped

Patrolling

- Not a task in itself

- Requires purpose, objective, end state

- Types- reconnaissance, security, combat

- Types of reconnaissance- area, zone, route

Principles of Patrolling

- Planning

- Reconnaissance / Situational Awareness

- Security

- Control

- Common Sense

**Not an event in itself
-must have a task and purpose**

Patrolling Planning Considerations

- Task organisation
- Patrol order / tasks
- Movement plan
- Coordination with others
- Routes
- MPKI / threat driven
- Risk analysis / mitigation
- Focus on PIR / IRs
- FP / security

- Medical evacuation
- Logistic support
- IEDs, mines, EOD
- Pre-inspections
- Rehearsals
- Patrol report /de-briefs
- S2 part of de-briefs
- C2
- Working with other components

Patrolling Control Measures

- Register marks
- Primary route
- Alternate route
- Rally points
- Checkpoints
- Pre-planned fire support
- Time of departure
- Time of return
- Call signs and frequencies box
- Brevity codes
- Target list
- Routine radio calls

Engagement, Coordination, Liason

Stakeholders in UNIBAT AOR / Area of Interest

ENGAGEMENT SYNC	PHASE 1	PHASE 2	PHASE 3	AUDIENCE	PRIORITY OF ASSETS	THEMES/ MESSAGES	INDICATOR & METHOD	MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS MOE
Secure Security forces Freedom of Movement (FoM) on main supply routes (MSR)	→→→→→			AA1, AA2, AA16	UN-EP MEDIA OPS UN-CIMIC Manoeuvre Elements	T8, T9 -Stay alert, stay safe; UN forces are working in the area. Cooperation is the way ahead. (SMS and Posters) -Road signs to increase UN forces FoM (livestock crossings) -For the safety of you and your families, do not interfere with UN convoys. (Radio)	-Known 80% saturation -DSR, media monitoring of how many people listen to the radio on a day-to-day basis. -UN-EP report from LN that observed the product.	- Decrease in reported interference with freedom of movement on MSR.

Engagement, Coordination, Liaison Planning Considerations

- Engage diverse organisations / groups

- Understand cultural sensitivities

- Different groups have different perceptions of the same topic

- Understand cultural and political roles in a community

- Who is in my AOR (military units, security forces), can they help

- Deconflict movement on MSRs

- Integrate / build human terrain / actor evaluation analysis products

- Supports FP and POC planning

Convoy Escort- Tactical Planning

- Not a routine task, requires a well-planned operational approach

- No short cuts in MDMP

- Task organisation tailored / based on threats

- Security and C2 established

- Many missions have SOPs and established TTPs

Convoy Escort Planning Considerations

Sections, elements, attachments could be included:

- Advance guard, close protection, rear guard, C2

- Interpreters

- Host Nation representatives

- EOD Team / Counter -IED Teams

- Engineering attachments for mobility

- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAS/ISR) support

- Engagement, human rights teams

- Logistics / medical teams

Cordon and Search (C&S)

Isolate

Secure area

Site exploitation

Search

Collect

Preserve

Cordon

- Used to isolate an area

- Usually precedes other operations, such as search, EOD

- Normally a COY

- Can protect the actions of HN security forces

- Can be a joint operations

Search

- Performed after cordon is set

- Site exploitation

- Arms, perpetrators of violence, evidence, illegal items, MPKI value, unexploded ordnance

- Normally, local police, FPU and UNPOL are employed

- May include detainee handling

C&S Planning Considerations

Cordon

- Area / point security

- Cover avenues of approach

- Inner cordon-entry / exit from area

- Snipers for observation and FP

- QRF central local

- Set early, night before operation; information operations with locals; possible include CIMIC activities

- Responsibilities understood for cordon and search elements, Command post established; control measure setC2

- Plan for crowd control

C&S Planning Considerations

Search

- Task organisation- special capabilities

- Support teams close-in security

- Search teams assist authorities

- Detainee handling teams, collection point

- Clear instructions to occupants – robust posture, dignity, respect, gender sensitivity

- Inform operations-local population

- Dignity and respect toward the population

- Records, confiscated items, chain of custody, tagging kits

How might you cordon this area

UNIBAT Support to DDR

Demobilization

Disarmament

Reintegration

- Reintegrating following a conflict

- Ex-combatants, armed groups, abductees, dependents, civilian returnees , communities

- Political, military, security, humanitarian, socio-economic dimension

Possible UNIBAT Contributions to DDR

_____

- Monitoring separation

- Monitoring withdrawal and disbandment

- Security at reception centers

- Collecting / inventory / transporting / storage / demolition of weapons, ammunition and explosive

Observation Post (OP)

- Not a task in itself; has purpose / end state
- Types- permanent, temporary, static, mobile
- Observe / report – vigilant to change
- FP / security
- Plan for day, night, bad weather
- Patrol and logistics plans to support site
- Medical / C3 / QRF planned / rehearsed

Check Point

- UNIBAT high-frequency PKO task

- Two types; static and mobile

- Must be a self-contained position

- Inspect/search personnel, vehicles and control movement in a designated area

- Helps establish a "safe area" that stays immune from outside

- Disadvantages: establishes a pattern as UN forces are static, procedures and equipment on display to possible threat actors

Check Point Planning

- Search, security, overwatch
- Search, control process
- Consider women, children
- Language assistance
- UN / local police, civil officials
- No U-turns or leaving road
- Observation / fields of fire
- Armored vehicles overwatch
- Obstacles / barriers
- Signs
- Search areas
- Early warning system
- Defensive positions
- C2 / reserve
- Sustainment plan
- Reports

Temporary Operating Base -TOB

- Military position, secure location **to project military force**

- Sustainable / logistical operations

- FP / defence plans

- Medical / QRF rehearsals

- Work plans

TOB

patrols outside perimeter

Defence & fire plan

work plan & prepare for future operations

physical Security & protection

base access

Early Warning Local Engagement

support & sustainment

Caution: TOB must be _**temporary**_ and project boots on the ground _**outside**_ TOB; can not be a self-absorbed operation

Defense Planning Considerations

Defense planning supports FP Planning

- Intelligence - threat based
- Command and control
- Movement / flexibility
- Use terrain advantages
- Disrupt attacker to regain initiative
- Integrated fires
- Sustain effort / protection
- Transition quickly

Defence Planning

- Outer / inner security patrols

- Establish observation plan

- Civilian engagement / coordination

- Establish primary, alternant and supplemental positions

- Direct / indirect weapons plan

- Emplace obstacles to deny

- Sustain ops- example, security 100 %, 50% consistent with threats

- Conduct ambushes to interdict

- Restrict access to locations

- Reaction force rehearsals

- Several means of comms to higher HQs

INF COY CP defense plan in a town

Effective defence planning supports FP

Take Away

- The troop leading procedures, mission analysis and threat assessments are critical steps in planning all tasks (no short cuts)

- Plans need to be approved by higher command

- DDR is an important aspect of PKO and the UNIBAT may play an important security role in the process

- Consultation, liaison, coordination with mission and non-mission actors are crucial in a PKO

- All tasks must include FP planning

Lesson 3.6
Tactical Planning Considerations for Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) / Reserve Forces (RES)

Lesson Contents

- QRF tactical planning considerations

- QRF control measures and special consideration

- RES tactical planning considerations

- RES control measures and special consideration

- Learning Activity

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the importance of existing mission and higher HQs documents when conducting mission analysis for QRF / RES

- Explain reinforcement operations in line with United Nations operational requirements

- Explain key tactical planning consideration for QRF and RES deployment and employment

Receipt of Mission

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Order's production

Execution

Mission Mandate

CONOPS

Mission FP / POC Strategy

Mission FP / POC Plan

Force Commander OPORD

Sector Commander OPORD

Receipt of mission

QRF Guidance- Documents

- Existing CONOPS w/ QRF involvement on-order or be prepared taskings
- Base defence plans
- Identified High Risk-Quadrant Threats
- Supporting FP Strategies / plans
- Established LZs / Air Movement Admin Requirements
- SOPs – Establishing Alert Cycles

Mission Analysis

Within the unit's Area of Responsibility (AOR)

1. ## Identification of Key Actors
   a. **UN Forces / UN Sites / UN / International populations**
   b. **Vulnerable civilian populations**
   c. **Potential perpetrators**
   d. **Host State security forces**
   e. **Key Govt Sites**

2. ## Threat Analysis
   a. **Running estimates**
   b. **Current situation COP**
   c. **MPKI products**
   d. **Hasty Reconnaissance**

3. ## Risk Analysis
   a. **Vulnerability / physical security assessment**
   b. **Protection actor capability assessment**
   c. **Danger level assessment**
   d. **Risk analysis matrix**

DIRECTION
ACQUISITION
ANALYSIS
DISSEMINATION

Figure 1: UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Cycle

UN / International Personnel/ Vulnerable Population

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Determine / Location / Size:

- UN / Internationals in AOR, Vulnerable populations

- Routine routes UN / International / Humanitarians

- UN operating bases with forces

- TOBs / Observation posts / Secure LZs / Airfields

- Existing FP / UN base defense Plans

- UN or Host country facilities or infrastructure guarded by UN forces (example Airfields)

- Potential areas of UN Force employment- UN / International personnel concentrations….example: WFP storage areas, DDR sites etc.

- **Air Nodes / transport Available- Admin requirements - Movement Orders pre-arranged**

UN / Key Sites/ Vulnerable populations

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

TOB

A

Regional UN CT HQs

LZ

C → **LZ** B **UN Base**

Routine Used Routes /MSRs

Airfield

WFP Warehouse complex D

Do not forget:
UNMOs; often live-in local communities
Secure LZs / Airfields in AOR
IDP / Refugee Camps

Key actors
Host State Security Forces

1. Location and area of influence or operations

2. Determine:

   - Size, capabilities

   - Ethnicity, religion and political affiliation

   - Will to support / assist QRF operations (secure site, LZ etc.,)

Host State Security Forces

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Host Nation Police Station

LZ

UN BASE

Host State Security Forces

If UN base defence plan has trigger for QRF assistance in extremis; host state security forces police / military may be of assistance to help reception / employment- secure LZ, marshalling area etc.

Potential Perpetrators

1. Pinpoint location and area of influence or operations

2. Determine:

   - Number, composition and C2
   - Ethnicity, religion and political affiliation
   - Hostile intent and historical background
   - Capabilities

3. Identify the leaders

Key actors
Potential Perpetrators

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

As they have influence on potential threats sites that QRF will reinforce / support the areas identified

Receipt of Mission
Mission analysis
Course of action
Orders production
Execution

Threat analysis
Overview

1. Priority consideration of threats identified at the mission level

2. Additional threats identified at the unit's AOR

For each threat determine:

-   Situation and type of threat (What)
-   Potential perpetrators (Who)
-   Potentially UN Force or operation affected (Whom)
-   Areas where the UN military may be targeted (Where)
-   Days and time of day attacks are most likely (When)
-   Motivation behind perpetrators threat of violence (Why)
-   Possible movements and tactics by perpetrators (How)

Violent attacks on any UN agency are a a threat / potential perpetrator

Risk analysis
Matrix

Receipt of Mission → Mission analysis → Course of action → Orders production → Execution

For identified threats

impact

Likelihood to happen and pre identified QRF future deployments

High

Medium

Low

1
2
3
4
5

Course of Action (CoA)

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

CoAs aim to reduce, neutralise, or eliminate the risk.

Development of CoAs are considered under phases and

ROE / Collateral damage must be considered

1. Plans to Deploy QRF to reduce / mitigate risks

2. Resources support synchronization with mission components

3. Coordination with protection actors

4. Coordinate - UN forces, UN bases, International groups, Un Sites

5. Vet COAs for impacts: political, humanitarian, security

Execution

- Alert cycle (Red, Amber, Green)

- Early warning mechanisms

- Running Estimates / Monitoring COP

- Deployment triggers / phased deployment

- Movement / transportation Admin requirements (example: MOV CON / Manifesting/ Civilian safety requirements etc.)

- C2- Commander on the scene vs QRF; reporting

- Phased deployment

- Higher HQs order process, back briefs, approval process

- CONPLANS rehearsal

- Fire support planning / control measures / coordination points (fratricide risks, helicopters use, observed fires, etc.)

- Actions on contact to neutralise

Receipt of Mission

Mission analysis

Course of action

Orders production

Execution

Reinforcement-
UNIBAT Units Assigned as
Reserve Forces (RES)

Introduction Reserve Forces

- Strengthen, additional forces, assistance, material, support; make stronger or more pronounced

- Relocating forces to area at risk

- Prevention, crisis management or defence

- Maintain flexibility

- Maintain structure to carry out FP / POC / assigned tasks

- The build-up of forces, a primary military instruments available to UN operations

Phases of Response

Best phases to Commit Reserve Forces

Prevention   Pre-emption   Response   Consolidation

Military POC planning and intelligence
efforts focused here for groups
associated with a high-risk criteria

Planning Consideration for RES

- Unit with module task organisation
- Equipment for multipurpose / all terrain
- Robust deployable logistic framework
- Planning and Intelligence cells
- C2 / Coordination

Coordination

- MPKI products
- Transportation / routes
- Geographic constraint
- C2 / communications assets/ reporting
- AOR adjustments
- Logistics
- Attachments and detachments
- Liaison

Intelligence Requirements / Assets

- MPKI products and assessments

- Air Recce

- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

- Recce / Patrols

- Terrain products / maps

Control Measures

- Assembly areas

- Assigned location of the legally obtained land for TOB

- Approach routes

- AOR / boundaries

- Legal agreements (use of land)

Take Away

- Tactical planning considerations are based on threat and risk analysis

- Maintaining situation awareness throughout the phases of deployment is key

- Coordination with higher HQs, mission interlocutors, local authorities and units on the ground is key to success

- Clarity in C2 is imperative

LEARNING ACTIVITY 1

To QRF Location 5 km

3 km

TOB of Company for UNIBAT

CP

Houses

IDP CAMP

School

To AG Loc 10 km

Houses

Not to Scale

N
NW NE
W E
SW SE
S

General Situation

- The UN Mission in Carana has been tasked to maintain a safe a secure environment, and to help neutralise armed groups attacking the civilian population, unilaterally or assisting the Host State Forces (HSF)

- The UN force maintains 3 UNIBAT in the Sector; each with a designated (rotating) QRF COY

- In a village, an IDP Camp about 500x500 meters size is loc 5 Km away from a QRF COY

- UNIBAT TOB Company that is responsible for the AOR is also loc 3 km from IDP camp and is spread out and over tasked

- The terrain near the IDP camp has small hills / mounds, a river that passes close by the south of the camp, and a village with houses 300 m south & 200m north of the camp

Specific Situation

- Recently an Armed Group called Maise Force (MF) has been attacking a UN sponsored UN sponsored medical response team of humanitarians in surrounding area

- Civilians are constantly under threat of physical violence in neighboring villages

- MPKI has confirm that there is a high probability that the MF will attack the IDP Camp within the week

- IDPs have started to travel to the UNIBAT TOB for protection and food

- UNIBAT has tasked the QRF to reinforce and secure the IDP camp to prevent and or neutralise MF attack on IDP Camp

Requirements

- The UNIBAT and QRF staff and leadership conducts a mission analysis to determine the MF most likely (ML) COA and most dangerous (MD) COA; list some of the tactical planning considerations, and provide key factors that the MF might consider in their approach to the IDP camp

- How might you task organise the QRF for the impending attack; what additional support / resources might the QRF commander ask for from UNIBAT, and what might the UNIBAT commander ask for from Sector HQs and FHQs

- What C2 arrangements should be considered

- Outline your deployment / employment plan in the area

- Who might you coordinate with before and during the deployment

LEARNING ACTIVITY 2

To QRF Location 5 km

Protection platoon quarters

5 km

A Company of No 2 Battalion

REFUGEE CAMP

CP

WFP

CP

Church

Houses

Not to Scale

General Situation

- A refugee camp with 1000 population
- A UN forces –UNIBAT COY is deployed to the outer security of the camp
- The TOB is on the northern side of the camp
- 4 watch towers at camp manned by host country security, 2 check points on road passing near the camp
- Camp is 100 m away from road and connected by a dirt track
- Refugee is camp is 500x500 meters
- UNIBAT HQs, 5 km from camp where the QRF is also stationed
- Area has small mounds in near vicinity of refugee camp
- A river is in the area which passes just south of the camp, Village of 20 houses located 300 m from camp
- Church is located southeast of the camp approx 200 m
- WFP distribution point is southwest camp across the main road
- Sector HQs has a UNIBAT in the Sector that has unengaged COY designated as a Sector Reserve and the Force HQs has additional reserve force assets

Specific Situation

Yesterday

- Villagers are at church and rations are being distributed to the refugees at a World Food Programme (WFP) distribution point nearby

- Fights by two groups break out at the distribution point and camp

- Groups start to demonstrate / protest near the WFP distribution point, the WFP personnel said that they have heard they may be in danger if the situation escalates

- Host nation forces do not have the security forces to reduce tensions and secure the distribution point

- Local village leader said he has information that other activist groups outside the local area are planning to travel to the site

- The UNIBAT COY has requested additional support

Requirements

- Is this going to be a long-term problem or a short-term problem? What resources might the UNIBAT commander consider, QRF, or RES forces, what criteria should be used when employing these forces

- List planning considerations, C2 / AOR concerns

- Outline your deployment / employment plan in the area

- Who might you coordinate with before and during the deployment

- If Sector and or Force HQs provide RES units? Who should plan the operation, what should the C2 arrangement be; what should the AOR be; does it need to be redesignated?

Lesson 3.7
United Nations Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (MILEOD) Planning Considerations

Content

- MILEOD Overview

- Capabilities

- MILEOD / UNIBAT mutual support arrangements

- Planning considerations

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the role / aim of MILEOD in PKO

- Describe support provided by EOD activities

- Outline what planning considerations should be included when deploying / working with MILEOD

- When an infantry unit is conducting an outer security operational cordon for an EOD (IEDD) incident; explain the C2 and coordination considerations while working with an EOD unit

Role of MILEOD

Counter EO threats in Peacekeeping Missions

- **Synchronises actions**

- **Intelligence fusion**

- **Standardises EOD capabilities**

EOD Philosophy

- Save Life- #1 priority

- Preservation of property

- Removal of the threat

- Recording / Recovery

- Return to normality

Before → EOD → Normal

UNIBAT leaders / planners working with MILEOD need to be aware of UN PKO EOD philosophy

MILEOD Supports the UNIBAT PKO

Mitigates EO effects / threats via advice, reconnaissance, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, disposal

Freedom of Movement

- Enhance operational effectiveness & efficiency
  - EOD response
    - Best used when provided a dedicated security element
 - Embedded EOD

Terminology – Key Terms

- *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*
  - *Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD)*
  - *Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD)*
- *Counter-IED*
  - *Train the Force*
  - *Defeat the Device (DtD)*
  - *Degrade the Network*
- *Explosive Ordnance (EO)*
  - *Explosive Remnants of War*

Counter-IED

3 Pillars to reduce the effects of IEDs / risk mitigation

C-IED

Train the Force

Degrade the Network

Defeat the Device

MPKI / Situational Awareness

Train the Force (TtF)

MILEOD can help train UNIBAT

Includes:

- Intelligence / situational awareness / threat analysis

- Identification

- Actions / drills

- Planning considerations

- Local population outreach (POC)

- Best practice's

Defeat the Device (DtD)

*A defensive line of operation for IED risk mitigation activities
to reduce effects of IED initiations*

Includes:

- Search activities

- CMD activities

- IEDD activities

- Support to mission partners

Degrade the Network (DtN)

Includes:

- Partnerships

- UNPKI / MPKI

- Evidence collection

- Exploitation

- Disrupt / reduce

- Preventive / Pre-emptive

MILEOD Structure, Capabilities and Support Activities

Generic MILEOD Structure

MILEOD Support Activities

- Core - CMD / IEDD

- Mobility

- FP advice

- Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)

- Electronic warfare countering RCIED threats – CREW assets

- Technical /tactical analysis IED incidents

13

CMD-Support to IED Threat Mitigation

- CMD not only remove hazards from AO also removes IED components & precursors

- Key enabler in IED TM

- Mines & ERW items can be used in IEDs

IEDD Capabilities

Operating Environment

Threat Driven
Likely to have to respond

Local Factors & Context

IEDD Capabilities

Specialist Competencies
- Knowledge
- Skills
- Attitude

Specialist Equipment

Support
- FP, Comms & Medical
- Search
- EDD
- CREW

Determines the tasks appropriately qualified and equipped to efficiently, effectively and safely respond

Facing a sophisticated IED threat, effectively trained

IEDD personnel should not be put under pressure to operate outside their EOD capabilities except in extreme circumstances

Mobility Planning Advice

Mobility & effort to maintain FoM in an IED threat environment is key operational activity

Contribute to FoM in an IED threat environment, advice for:

- **Terrain, route analysis to identify VP & VA**

- **Reduce IED risks at VP & VA**

- **Advice route clearance and use of assets**

- **Planning support**

A key input into the overall UN COP

Force Protection Advice

Technical EOD expert assistance WITH IED threats; intended to mitigate the threat against personnel, vehicles and friendly force locations

FP advice may involve technical details on the level of PPE required or simple IED or wider explosive hazard threat awareness

FP advice can also extend to advice in relation to the provision of tactical advice in terms of the TTPs to be utilized by troops operating in an IED threat environment

A key input into the overall UN COP

EW Support Countering RCIED Threats

- Exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum

- Search, interception, identification of electromagnetic emissions

- Employment of electromagnetic energy to reduce / prevent hostile use of the spectrum

- CREW assets mitigate RCIED threats

- CREW assets use electronic: jamming, deception, neutralisation

Force Protection Using CREW Assets

- CREW assets used as an all arms IED TM asset on vehicles or personnel moving through an area with an assessed RCIED threat

- Use of CREW assets require additional planning

- Considerations for commanders using CREW assets is covered in UN EOD Military Manual

Best practice - expert advice be sought when planning movements requiring CREW assets

Considerations Deploying CREW Assets

Suite of systems to mitigate assessed risks

Virtual envelope surrounding personnel

Planning ranges, movement configurations

CREW expertise

Units deployed with multiple CREW systems

CREW assets, both mounted and dismounted

De-conflict systems

Life cycle management

Planning Considerations- CREW Assets

- Use by search or IEDD personnel

- Environment assessed to have RCIED threats

- Separate planning required

- Man-pack vs vehicle mounted systems

- EOD can give expert advice to UNIBAT leadership

Support Considerations

EOD deploys on short notice in semi/non-permissive environments

EOD units need earmarked support for
- Force Protection (FP)
- Communication via VHF & HF
- Logistical & Medical support

UNIBAT may provided support to the EOD unit for the duration of mission

Planning Consideration-Common Requests by EOD for Support

- Security Forces / Recce
- Search teams
- Transportation
- Engineer Assets
- Communications
- CREW
- Language Assistants
- CASEVAC

Tactical Level C2 with UNIBAT

- UNIBAT Leadership must recognize MILEOD technical expertise / recommendations

- MILEOD typically tasked with other assets

- Considerations related to location

EOD working with Search & Force Protection

Who has C2 during phases of operation and how is C2 handed over?

Tactical Level C2

Incident Commander (IC) sets Incident Coordination Point (ICP) at location

Typically, the tactical commander providing local security is the IC and has C2 of overall IED / CMD incident

IC coordinates operation with advice from EOD operator and other support capabilities

EOD operator advise IC on EO threats. IC establishes control of the Operational cordon

Best practice EOD cordon within operational cordon where EOD commander exercises C2

Task completion, full incident report submitted according to SOPs

Op Cordon

EOD Cordon

C2 Relationships-Planning Considerations

- Articulated in orders
- MILEOD typically tasked with other assets
  - Dedicated security or embedded in patrols/convoys
- FP, search, medical, comms, transport, logistics, CREW operators
- When not organic, C2 needs to be clarified
- MILEOD has scalable capabilities
  - IEDD vs CMD
- Air transportation

Specific Support

Engineering

- Route Recce
- Route Clearance
- Vulnerable Point / Area threat mitigation
- General Engineering for Force Protection
- Heavy Engineer Equipment

Communications

- Equipment
  - UN Force / Inter-Sector Communications
  - Communications with HN Security Forces
- CREW (ECM)
  - Employment
  - Frequency spectrum management

Take Away

MILEOD PKO involve CMD & IEDD activities in conjunction with FP

MILEOD supports:
- Mobility and FP planning, advice and support
- Electronic warfare countering RCIED threats – CREW assets
  - Proper CREW utilization supported by a spectrum manager
- Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)

Planning Considerations
- Support requirements for EOD operations – Dedicated Security
- C2 relationships at force, tactical, support levels
- C2 delineation / establishing IC and cordons – EOD & security C2
- UNIBAT - MILEOD partnership; coordination is key to success

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Questions

Team Exercise

Situation Following increase IED attacks in FOLSA (UNIBAT AOR), the National Police searched a suspected bomb maker's house. One police officer was killed, another wounded when a box was opened near a workbench. The arrested bomb maker gave info about another location storing IED components and warned the police to be careful. The police have no bomb squad. They requested you, the UNIBAT Commander for help in searching / protecting the local population. Force HQs gave permission and directed you TACON of UN forces that are available to support an operation. You direct your staff to start planning. What tactical planning considerations should the staff include; how best to integrate EOD assets, and how best to mitigate risks to the population and UN forces.

IDP Camp #1

IDP Camp #2

Village Administration

Suspect Compound

UNHCR

UN

Airstrip

Central Market

Hospital

Folsa

Population: 10,000
Elevation: 110 m

Buildings

Unpaved Road

Track

River

UN Operating Base

0   1Km   2Km

where policeman killed

Scene where police injured

Components from the scene which injured Policemen previously

Motorcycle Battery

KL-K103X Receivers

Recent UAS Image

Compound Entrance

N

3 km To Airstrip

Suspect Compound in Folsa
Date: DD/MM/YYYY
Grid: ABC123
Alt: 8000ft

Analyst comment: The Compound Measure 50 m by 75 m in a triangular shape and has one entrance from the eastern edge. The compound contains at least 4 buildings. Surveillance was conducted over 40 hours and there was no movement detected into or within the compound for the duration. UAS Asset was then re-tasked by FHQ.

Lesson 3.8
Tactical Planning Considerations for Crowd Control

Lesson Contents

- Conceptual- review

- Task organisation considerations

- Tactical planning considerations

- Command and control considerations

- Logistical considerations

Learning Outcomes

- Explain crowd control in a UNPKO

- Explain how to apply MDMP in planning crowd control operations

- Explain command and control demands for crowd control

Principles

- Speed
- Mission and Objective
- Cooperation with Host Nation (HN)
- Defense / protection
- Warning
- Security
- Surprise / manoeuvre
- Minimum use of force / graduated manner
- Domination of the area

Troop Employment Priorities

1st - Host nation security forces

2nd - UN police (UNPOL)

3rd - Formed police units

4th - Military contingents

Conditions for Use of Military Components in Crowd Control

- Absence or willingness of law enforcement authority in host country

- Capacity limitations of UNPOL/FPUs

- Armed elements / potential violent actors

- Tasked by UN Mission authority

- **Only** if unit is trained and equipped for crowd control

Purpose for Crowd Control

- Maintain mobility of UN operations

- Maintain stability in areas on interest

- Deter violence

- Secure sensitive infrastructure- electric plants, bridges, food supply, ports, UN facilities

- Support FP / POC strategies

Task Organization Considerations

- MPKI / threat based / crowd size

- Risk assessment

- C2 / joint operations

- Host nation support

- Forces available

- Terrain / weather

- Capabilities and equipment available

Tactical Planning Considerations

- Review joint policies / SOPs

- Conduct a threat / risk analysis

- Focus on Human Terrain / Key Actors

- Task organise teams and units for contingencies

- Conduct a joint reconnaissance

- Designate teams- record, take photos, collect evidence (chain of custody); prepare for detainees

- Defense support package- sandbags, wire, barriers

- Plan for reinforcements / QRF

Tactical Planning Considerations Cont.

- Pre-position support packages

- Actively patrol prior, during, post operation

- Plan for redundant communications

- Include- engagement teams, legal, civil / military organisations, language assistance

- Cordon and isolate the area of operations

- Plan for detainees- processing kits, teams, guards, collection points, food / water, female search teams

Command, Control and Coordination Considerations

- C2 established early and understood by all

- All plans briefed and approved by higher HQs

- Clear understanding of risks / use of force

- Shared common operating picture

- Responsibilities assigned and understood by all

- Reporting mechanisms

- Support- UN mission civilian components, Force HQs, ISR assets, trained negotiators, UNMOs, legal, Public Affairs, Investigation Officers (NIO)

Coordinate- local / host nation authorities / security forces

- Collaborate actions; if appropriate / authorized, share MPKI products

- Expected outcomes

- Expectations of population in relation to UN

- Consequences of demonstrations / press coverage

- Coordination / control mechanisms

- Explain UN responsibility related to POC and FP

Considerations for the Use of Force

- Minimal and proportional use of force (graduated)

- Self-defense

- Prevention of unfavorable results

- Support to host government security forces

- Responsibilities- human rights, POC

- Criteria / framework briefed to and approved by higher HQs

Logistics / Support Considerations

- Planning- include Force HQs and DMS reps

- Locate forward logistic trains to support operation

- Pre-stocked supplies and secure

- Increase- drinking water and medical

- Possible support for detainees and crowd injuries

- Non-lethal weapons and specialised equipment requirements- parts / maintenance

Actions / Checklist Before Operations

- Check lethal / non-lethal arms and ammunition

- Automatic weapons set to single shot

- Respirators and masks serviceability

- Coordinate with host nation authorities

- Equipment for night operations

- Review MPKI products / acquisition collection plan

- All briefed on the Use of Force

- Medical supplies / hasty defense kits on hand

- Teams assigned to handle detainees / kits inventoried

Take Away

- Consider the principles when planning for crowd control

- Coordination with civilian components, host nation and interlocutors is important

- Approved plans by higher HQs and all understand use of force framework

- Prepositioning of support and logistics

Learning Activity

General Situation

- You are deployed as a planner in a UNIBAT

- UNIBAT strength is 755, with 3 motorised companies and one mechanised

- After a crisis that hit the host country with a UNPKO, the President decided to increase fuel prices by 70%, and 55% for basic food items. The Patriotic Movement of (MPC), a group of ex-combatants dissatisfied with the government, is planning massive demonstrations to take place in three days. The roads are currently clear, and traffic is normal

- The FC ordered your UNIBAT to secure and the road open between the capital center and the airport (5 km)

- There are no FPUs assigned to the mission

Specific Situation A

Upon leaving the base, the UNIBAT force came across obstacles on the road that blocked the troop's passage. The force receive stones from 15-20 civilians demonstrating. Vehicle windshields were hit by stones and damaged.

- What considerations and measures (preventive / preemptive) might you have planned for to neutralize the threats / reduce the risks

Specific Situation B

Arriving to an assigned location to secure a key chock point, the force ran into larger demonstrations with newly built obstacles (that morning) blocking the road. The protesters threaten to throw Molotov cocktails if the force passed through the barricade. Some of your soldiers were injured by stones being thrown by the protestors.

- What considerations and measures (preventive / preemptive) might you have planned for to neutralise the threats / reduce the risks

Specific Situation C

The neighboring country's embassy, requested UN support to move its personnel and 20 civilian vehicles to the airport. The FC ordered your UNIBAT to secure the embassy premises and provide a security escort for the civilian convoy to the airport.

- What are the necessary coordination's measures might you take

- How might you task organise the force and what are some of the key tasks

- What support should the UNIBAT ask for from the FHQs / mission

Specific Situation D

Demonstrations continue in large numbers, the economic situation is deteriorating, the population demands for the president's resignation. A large demonstration is expected in the upcoming days. The UN Police Component assets were deployed to the interior of the country. Protesters now surround the Government Palace in GALASI (capital). A small number of demonstrators are inside the 1st Minister's Palace. The palace is assigned a national security force (50 police officers) that are trained in crowd control. The UNIBAT has received orders from the Force Commander to help secure the presidential / government facility.

Presidential Palace

Specific Situation D

- What tasks should be issued to company commanders; how might you task organise the UNIBAT for success

- What coordination needs to be done

- What are the planning considerations for support

- What might be some of your key request for information, IR and additional ISR assets

- What are some of the C2 considerations

- How would you plan to handling detainees

- What event might trigger the employment of a QRF and where should the QRF be positioned

Lesson 3.9
Planning Considerations for Handling Detainees

Lesson Content

- Planning phases

- Tactical planning considerations

- Special considerations

- Coordination

Learning Outcomes

- Describes the planning phases for the handling of detainees

- Explain key planning considerations for each phase

- Explain unique considerations for females and children

- List key actors that the UNIBAT should consider coordinating with when handling detainees

Possible Circumstances for Detention

- ## POC- threat to civilians

- Protection- human rights

- Checkpoints / cordon & searches

- Offence in presence of a UN force / unit

- Support public order / crowd control

- Carrying out a disarmament

- FP- threat to UN forces / property

Within the UN Mandate and Agreements

Planning Phases for Handling Detainees

- Apprehension

- Processing

- Transfer / handover

Conduct a threat-based analysis approach and use UN MPKI processes and products

Planning Considerations - Apprehension

- Task organisation -dedicated teams, search, guards, processing, recording

- Isolate- protected site for initial processing

- Logistical- kits, cameras, restraints, food, water

- Language assistance available

- Forms / records kits -seizure of property

- Check for injuries / initial medical screening / first aid

- Site survey of the area

Processing

- Reporting and records maintained

- Medical examination – medical personnel

- Questioning; detainee's responses recorded

- Identity verified

- Transported to a detention site

- Chain of custody maintained for sized items

- Coordination with interlockers

Transfers / Handover

- Security

- Resources and task organisation

- Records and personal property

- Notification / coordination

Female Detainees

- Female present during all contact

- Keep separate from males

- Females search females

- Considerations for pregnant / nursing females

Child Detainees

- Last resort, an extreme measure

- Protect from harm, separate from adults

- Immediately notified- higher HQs and Child Protect Advisor

Coordination

- Brief plans to higher HQs

- Plan to liaise and give access to UN and international organisations / agencies

- Report to higher HQs

- Seek guidance from higher HQs; DFP is key to the process

Take Away

- Always plan for detainees in every operation; use phases as a tool

- Key to success- (UNIBAT) transfer / handover detainees as soon as possible

- Document and record all aspects of the process; use forms provided in SOPs

- Special considerations for females and children

- Report and coordinate with the appropriate HQs, DFP, agencies and organisations

Lesson 3.10

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Tactical Planning Considerations

Lesson Contents

- ISR / acquisition planning

- Tactical planning considerations and factors

- Employment of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in support of ISR

Learning Outcomes

- Describe key elements of ISR acquisition planning

- Explain ISR planning considerations and factors

- Explain the considerations for the employment of UAS in support of ISR / acquisition

The basics of ISR Planning

- The planning environment

- Resources available

UNIBAT ISR Assets

- **Infantry COY (patrols)**
- **Engagement Platoon**
- **Class 1 unmanned aerial systems (UAS)**
- **ISR Platoon**

ISR Platoon

UNIBAT ISR Platoon

- Trained in reconnaissance and surveillance

- May have a tactical UAS section

- Surveillance section coordinates employment of other sensors, including ground surveillance radar

- Normally S2 coordinates ISR platoon activities

Acquisition Planning

- Short-term 72 to 24 hours

- Medium-term beyond 72 hours

- Strategy

- Avoid redundancy

ISR Acquisition Planning Elements
## Short- & medium-term overview

1. Intelligence Acquisition List (IAL) planning horizon is 72 hours; flexible to accommodate new time-sensitive tasking

2. ISR planners use:
   - 72-hour point
   - 48-hour point
   - 24-hour point

   As the IAL gets to the 24-hour mark, it is more accurate & refined; it is ready to pass to ISR Ops for execution

ISR Acquisition Planning Elements
Acquisition Strategy

1. Systematic plan: optimize taskings, request available, appropriate acquisition assets

2. ISR assets:
   a) 1st organic
   b) 2d adjacent, higher HQs
   c) Other available sources

Requires close cooperation between PKI analysts and ISR assets managers / units

ISR Acquisition Planning Elements (03)

Avoid **redundancy** in tasking ISR capabilities and consider:

- Convergent
- Sequential
- Swarm
- Probing
- Queuing

Key Considerations and Factors affecting ISR Planning

- What gaps / RFIs need closing

- Which ISR capabilities to use

- Where are the ISR capabilities

- Is the ISR capabilities able to answer my question

Deployment and tactical planning considerations for unmanned aerial systems (UAS)

UAS Employment Considerations

Understanding task

Airspace considerations

**C2**

Endurance

Range

Planning Considerations

- Launch / recovery times

- Communications, frequency management / interference

- Logistic footprint

- Data storage and accessibility

- Aircraft safety

Tasking

- Commander's intent (mission goals)
- Clear reporting lines
- Command and control

UAS Tasking

- Management:

- Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC)

- Mission Chief Aviation Officer

- Class II & III – U2 (ATO)

- Class I U2 (ATO) / SOP

Tasking authority – example

UNIBAT S2/S3 thru Sector HQs
Request ISR Support for PIR/IR/ NAI Surveillance

FHQ U2

DCOS OPS

FC approval → Likely delegated → Force Approval

DMS Approval → Likely delegated → Mission Approval

MAOC / CAVO

Manned/unmanned asset

ATO

Employment of Class II & III UAS

- Through Air Tasking Order (ATO)

- Operate under UN aviation standards

- Understand command-and-control measures

- Mission in coordination with host nation is responsible for airspace management and coordination

Class I UAS Limitations

- Operations within 8 Km from airfield or heliport restricted

- Maximum altitude 400 feet above ground level

- Visual Line of Sight operations only

- Night operations coordinated with Mission's Aviation Section

- Not flown near other aircraft

Manned ISR Aircraft

- **Type of sensors / cameras**

- **Endurance**

- **Response time - speed over distance**

- **Human engagement allows more flexibility over area**

Take Away

- ISR planning is tied to MPKI and acquisition fundamentals

- UNIBAT acquisition planners incorporate their own ISR assets as well as requesting Sector / Force HQs / Mission assets when available

- UNIBAT acquisition strategy requires cooperation between UNIBAT planners, Intel cells at all levels, ISR assets / elements / units

- Assign the appropriate UAS asset that best supports the requirement; coordination with higher HQs is essential

Questions?